INTELLIGENCE AS A PROFESSION

 

Thomas C. Bruneau

Center for Civil – Military Relations

Naval Postgraduate School

Monterey, California

Introduction

My argument in this paper is that there is great value in studying intelligence as a profession. Approached from the perspective of a profession, outsiders can begin to comprehend the nature and scope of what intelligence officers and analysts do for a living. Further, by submitting intelligence to scrutiny from the perspective of a profession, those within the community may be better able to understand how others view them and thereby their isolation from state and society may be minimized.[1] My purpose in this paper, as in an earlier article, is modest: To help demythologize intelligence in new and not so new democracies by providing, through the prism of intelligence as a profession, an introduction to some of the key issues involved in intelligence work and thereby provide a beginning for academics and policy – makers in many countries that might want to begin to control their intelligence apparatuses.

Professions

I have found in teaching courses on Comparative Politics and on Civil – Military Relations in Democratic Consolidation at the Naval Postgraduate School that it is very useful to focus on professions. The Random House Dictionary defines a profession as an occupation, especially one requiring extensive education in a branch of science or the liberal arts. Those who are commonly considered professionals include doctors, lawyers, professors, military officers, and politicians. The biggest stretch for most observers is to view politicians as professionals. Yet, in his essay, “Politics as a Vocation,” Max Weber makes it clear that politics is indeed a profession since, again drawing on the Random House Dictionary, a vocation is a particular occupation, business, or profession; a calling. In modern democracies the trend is towards politicians as professionals. It is not something entered into easily, and if successful the politician develops characteristics that are more commonly shared by other politicians than with anyone else. At NPS we introduce our officer students to the concept of politics as a profession in order for them to better understand the nature and dynamics of politicians, those elected officials, and other appointed civilian officials, to whom they are responsible in their profession.

When CCMR does short courses on civil – military relations abroad, we routinely include the topic of the military as a profession. We do this both to educate civilians, who often have had no contact with officers, in the nature of the military, and also to establish a base line from which the officers themselves may judge where they stand. In short, I have found that in teaching here and abroad the concept of professions is a useful tool for understanding and analysis.

A profession is commonly defined in terms of the three criteria of expertise, ethic, and corporateness.[2] Expertise concerns the role or function of the professional. That is, what the professional does for the client. Obviously there will of necessity be some element of education or training involved in the expertise. Ethic is how the professional is governed or regulated; its ethos. The ethic must include some form of enforcement mechanism. Corporateness is the profession’s sense of itself. Corporateness must include the means of entry into the profession. It should not be difficult for the reader to imagine these three criteria with reference to the professions noted above. Before discussing intelligence as a profession we must first briefly review what is meant by intelligence. We will see that intelligence, even in fairly stable and well established democracies, is very diverse. Consequently, we must consider not just intelligence as a profession but sub-fields of intelligence as a profession.

The Meaning of Intelligence

Due to the scope and diversity of intelligence, there is disagreement on its meaning.[3] Intelligence is mainly defined by process. That is, the process of gathering and using information for some purpose. Since processes are varied, as are the sources of information and their ends, much is of necessity left vague. Most discussions within the intelligence community center on tradecraft; the “how to” of sources, methods, and analysis rather than the “what is”? Further the intelligence community either by design or habit is characterized by vagueness and ambiguity. This attitude, or approach, is probably intentional: to not convey information. Once one becomes aware of intelligence, and its limits, there is an even greater awareness that not everything is knowable, let alone known. Further, intelligence officers are trained to collect information and not to provide it except to very few of their superiors with a need to know. This tendency pervades the whole field of intelligence. They are professionals in intelligence; information is their vocation.Given our purposes here, and focusing on the new democracies, we must use a broad definition of intelligence in order to convey the scope of what it can include, which is extremely broad.[4] Glenn P. Hastedt in Controlling Intelligence states succinctly: “The four elements of intelligence are clandestine collection, analysis and estimates, covert action, and counter-intelligence.”[5] Loch Johnson elaborates this synthesis:

Intelligence commonly encompasses two broad meanings. First, the secret agencies acquire and interpret information about threats and opportunities that confront the nation, in an imperfect attempt to reduce the gaps and ambiguities that plague open sources of knowledge about the world. A nation especially seeks secret information to help it prevail in times of war, with as few casualties as possible. Second, based on information derived from denied and open sources, policymakers call upon their intelligence agencies to shield the nation against harm (counterintelligence) while advancing its interests through the secret manipulation of foreign events and personalities (covert action). Intelligence thus involves both information and response.[6]

 

For our purpose here, intelligence is understood as these four functions: collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action. Intelligence also refers to the organization collecting the information and the information collected. As all individuals and organizations collect and process information, this information in itself is not the defining characteristic. The key characteristics are that these functions are centered in and intended for the state and they are secret. This knowledge thus has a dual nature; it is information but it is secret information used by the state. What follows is a very brief review of these four functions.[7]

Collection

Intelligence organizations collect information. The questions are what kinds of information do they collect and what means they employ to collect it. At a minimum, they use what today are termed “open sources” which includes periodicals, “the web,” and seminars and conferences. There is an ongoing debate regarding open vs. classified sources since so much information on so many topics is readily available.[8] Another distinction is between human intelligence, or HUMINT, and scientific and technical intelligence to include SIGINT (from intercepts in communications, radar, and telemetry), IMINT (including both overhead and ground imagery), and MASINT (which is technically derived intelligence data other than imagery and SIGINT). HUMINT is information collected directly by people and includes information provided by ambassadors or defense attaches as part of their normal reporting routines, information obtained at public and social events, and information obtained clandestinely through spies, reading others’ mail, and documents. HUMINT is the traditional “espionage,” or spying, mainly the use of agents in another country to provide secret information to their case officers who forward it to their home agencies.

Analysis

Raw intelligence is not much good without analysis. Analysis, or the anticipation of analysis, also shapes collection requirements. Analysis, what to conclude from raw information, has always been the big challenge in intelligence. The problem is not only with the processing of gigantic quantities of data, but even more with what conclusions to derive from the information. Production is only the first step; the intelligence must then be marketed. Analysis, in short, is not a simple technical issue but rather includes methods, perceptions, and political preferences. Much of the analytical literature on intelligence in the US and USSR focuses precisely on whether, and to what extent, leaders use the information provided to them by intelligence organizations.[9] For purposes of definition, then, analysis in this paper includes marketing the product to the decision-maker.

Counterintelligence

At its most basic, the purpose of counterintelligence is to protect the state, and its secrets, against other states or organizations. Seemingly clear and straightforward in these terms, in fact it can become, in the words of the long-time and controversial head of counterintelligence at the CIA, James Angleton “‘the wilderness of mirrors,’ where defectors are false, lies are truth, truth lies, and the reflections leave you dazzled and confused.”[10] Abram N. Shulsky defines the huge scope of issues involved:

In its most general terms, counterintelligence refers to information collected and analyzed, and activities undertaken, to protect a nation (including its own intelligence-related activities) against the actions of hostile intelligence services. Under this definition, the scope of counterintelligence is as broad as the scope of intelligence itself, since all manners of hostile intelligence activities must be defended against.[11]

 

The implications for democracy are serious in new democracies where counterintelligence was the principal function of intelligence services. The intelligence service sought to root out real and imagined enemies of the state, often resulting in yet more opposition leading to a spiral of violence. If even in established democracies a certain amount of paranoia is inherent in counterintelligence – “there is an enemy at work here and we must root him out,” in less institutionalized and non-democratic Third World countries this attitude routinely resulted in extreme violation of human rights and impunity for the intelligence officers.[12]

Covert Actions

Covert actions, or as the British term them “special political actions” and the Soviets “active measures,” are actions intended to influence another state by means that are not identified with the state behind the actions. There are three main categories of covert action. The first is propaganda that includes the utilization of the media in another country to convey a certain message. The second is political action which includes funding or other support to government leaders, political parties, unions, religious groups, the armed forces, and the like to follow a certain course of action in another country. The third type of covert action is paramilitary activity, which involves the use of force. It includes smaller actions, like assassination or arming and training a small contingent of dissident tribal groups, or it can be large such as the Bay of Pigs invasion. Mr. Richard Bissell, who knew from the inside all about American covert action, has elaborated a straightforward rationale for covert action:

It becomes overwhelmingly obvious that we are deeply concerned with the internal affairs of other nations and that, insofar as we make any effort to encourage the evolution of the world community in accord with our values, we will be endeavoring purposefully to influence these affairs. The argument then turns out to be not about whether to influence the internal affairs of others, but about how…. Open diplomacy, however, has its limitations as a policy tool. There are times when a great power can best attain its objectives by acting in total secrecy.… On certain occasions, however, a great power may seek to influence the internal affairs of another nation without its knowledge or without the knowledge of the international community. These circumstances require covert action.[13]

 

Obviously not every country has robust capabilities in all four intelligence functions, but the fact that they exist, that somenations have these capabilities, means that this is the global framework within which intelligence must be understood. Intelligence is created to defend the state. It must defend it within the context of potential enemies, other states and non – state actors, and taking into consideration the instruments they have available. All countries have some degree of awareness of the intelligence capabilities of other countries and the fact that they will be involved in, or even the target of, collection and covert action.

The Security Intelligence State

In virtually all authoritarian regimes, under Marxist-Leninist or military control, the intelligence apparatus was a key element for maintaining power. These regimes were based on something other than democratic legitimacy exercised through free and fair elections. They had to rely on organizations to identify domestic opponents, neutralize their opposition to the government, and seek through a variety of means, including a controlled media, to generate at least domestic apathy. In most cases these organizations were security services. Precisely because of this heavy reliance and its centrality to power, the intelligence apparatus grew in size and power, with the result that they were largely autonomous even within authoritarian regimes which attempted to tightly control most areas of state and society.[14] In these countries, intelligence meant mainly counterintelligence. That is, protecting the state’s secrets from outsiders, which meant anyone outside the central core of power. And, as almost anything could be defined as a state secret the scope of that which had to be controlled was immense. While in most instances the intelligence service rhetorically linked internal opposition to putative foreign enemies, the overwhelming focus of the intelligence service in most countries was domestic opposition and not other states.[15] In sum, in most new democracies the one intelligence function that overwhelmed all others, was counterintelligence. Unfortunately this function, and the organizations and individuals that go with it, is the hardest to dislodge; to bring under democratic civilian control and to professionalize.

The Challenge of Democratic Consolidation

Despite efforts by students of comparative politics to develop models of democratic transitions, these transitions are largely sui generis and defy generalization. Studies have shown that the authoritarian regimes collapsed due to their successes as well as their failures, or the actions or inaction by domestic elites or foreigners, but in any case power finally passed on to more or less popularly elected civilians.[16] Transitions are one thing, which mainly allowed new, democratic, regimes to emerge, but they do not necessarily result in stable democratic regimes. Today, in the field of Comparative Politics and Civil – Military Relations, the main focus is on democratic consolidation. Consolidation is a useful concept because it reflects the idea that a new regime’s structures and processes are becoming stable. That is, a democratic regime is consolidated when the elites and the masses accept it as “the only game in town.”[17] This acceptance is no easy task, especially if one considers the basic characteristics for a regime to be termed democratic. A standard definition of contemporary democracy is as follows:

Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives.[18]

 

For the accountability to function procedural minimal conditions are necessary. They include the often–noted seven fundamental guarantees ensuring free and fair elections such as freedom of speech, association, running for office, and the like, which constitute a corpus of guarantees requiring a supportive culture to survive. As more countries began to consolidate their new democracies, scholars identified a further defining characteristic that is the requirement that no unelected body, such as a council of mullahs or a military revolutionary council or national security council has authority over the popularly elected officials. And, it is increasingly recognized that in countries such as Peru under Fujimori, that the intelligence apparatus was precisely such an organization.

A political environment in which these guarantees pertain is obviously very far from the structures and culture of the prior authoritarian regime. Major challenges are found both in the lack of recent experience with democracy and the difficulty of the population valuing these new structures and processes lacking this background. Also, in most cases the countries are confronting economic problems often accompanied by social disruption. Overall, democracy is a very demanding political system for elites and average citizens. Both should be involved for it to function well. New democracies are very tentative. The issue is how to develop the trust and transparency in the context of the legacies of the authoritarian regime. It is possible that the intelligence apparatus is not under government control, but instead has power over the civilian officials. This seems to be the case in Russia today.[19] If the elected government does not control intelligence it is by definition not a consolidated democracy.

Intelligence and Democracy

All countries have an intelligence apparatus of some scope and capability. The question for new democracies is: what kinds of intelligence do they need and how can it be controlled? While the challenge is especially severe in the new democracies, democratic control of intelligence is a challenge everywhere for at least four reasons. First, as Pat Holt states “Secrecy is the enemy of democracy.”[20] Why? Because secrecy encourages abuse. If there is secrecy how can there be accountability, the fundamental mechanism of democracy? Because intelligence organizations are secret they themselves can avoid the checks and balances on which democracy is based. Second, intelligence agencies are not only secret but these organizations also collect and analyze information, and information means power. Intelligence organizations take on agendas and purposes of their own. Secrecy limits public scrutiny. Peter Gill uses the analogy of the “Gore-Tex” state to illustrate the degree of domestic penetration by the security intelligence services. Information flows in one direction and not two directions; to the intelligence services and not from them to state and society.[21] Intelligence may be autonomous from state control and, through the use of information that others do not have they may determine policy. There are two further perceptual or behavioral elements, beyond secrecy and the unique control of information, that hinder democratic control of intelligence organizations. Third, intelligence officers and their organizations routinely break laws abroad. Indeed, in most cases they do not admit to who they are or for whom they work. Further, spying is illegal everywhere. Intelligence case officers provide undeclared funds to foreign nationals as agents and authors of articles, tap phones, steal documents, and the like, all of which are illegal. There may be a problem in making the distinction between breaking laws abroad and not breaking them at home. Fourth is the self-justification that intelligence is critical to defense of the nation. In the words of Peter Wright, “It [intelligence] is a constant war, and you face a constantly shifting target.”[22] It is up to the intelligence organizations to root out spies, domestic and foreign, who are threats to the nation. They may easily perceive that they, more than anyone else, really know what is going on; how dangerous the threat really is. The intelligence officers’ task is to identify threats to the nation, and there are always threats; the only question is, how serious are the threats. They know things, and others do not, and this may lead to a certain condescending attitude regarding others who are not in the know, who are not initiated into the club.

 

Towards Democratic Civilian Control of Intelligence

Basic Decisions to be Made

 

In view of the difficulty everywhere to control intelligence, and considering the background in most new democracies, what are the choices to be made and what are the implications of different options for democratic control? Initially, and this is really a requirement that is the same regarding the armed forces, democracies must establish a clear and comprehensive legal framework. Intelligence is “slippery,” and if the legal framework is not clear and explicit intelligence agencies can never be brought under control. The legal framework must emerge from the democratic structures and processes, and must seek to ensure in the area of intelligence the continuation of the democratic values that they seek to promote. In South Africa, for example, soon after the transition to majority rule in 1994, the government initiated through the legislative process reform of the intelligence apparatus. This involved three major bills in parliament, which clearly defined and restructured the intelligence system. [23] In Brazil it took considerably longer after the transition to civilian government in 1985; indeed, it was only in 1999 that the ABIN (Brazilian Intelligence Agency) was created to replace the authoritarian regime’s National Intelligence Service (SNI). The Brazilian Congress played a central role in the creation of ABIN, and the legislation does provide a legal basis for civilian control of intelligence. [24]

There are three general decisions to be made regarding intelligence, which should be stipulated, in this clear and explicit legal framework. The first choice is to determine which of the four intelligence functions will be implemented and how much of the country’s resources will be allocated to them. The former part of the question can be answered only by assessing the global and regional situation, threats alliances, recent history, and available resources. The latter part of the question is a political decision. How much is intelligence worth? Obviously it is worth a great deal if it provides the nation with the means to maintain its independence in the face of a hostile neighbor. Intelligence also can be valuable as a force multiplier in lieu of larger armed forces. It can allow a country to focus its forces on the most serious threats thereby minimizing redundancy and higher operational costs. But to assess what it is really worth requires a political decision. Does the mere fact of having a certain level of intelligence capability avoid hostile intentions and actions? It also depends on its relationship with other, more powerful, countries that may share intelligence capabilities with it. Neither of these decisions can be made in a vacuum, and they should be integrated into an overall framework for decision- making in defense. The main point is, however, that there must be an analysis of what the nation requires and how much it is willing to pay for it. There is a huge debate in the United States after September 11, 2001 in that the approximately $30 billion allocated for intelligence did not prevent the terrorist attacks.

Regarding who makes these decisions and how the coordination is achieved, the evidence is consistent that it is the top level of the executive branch of government. In the United States the National Security Council holds this responsibility. In Brazil, after the most recent reforms, it is the Secretariat of Institutional Security directly under the president. And, in South Africa after the reforms in the mid – 1990s, it is the National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee that reports directly to the president and the cabinet.

The second choice concerns the balance in intelligence between civilian and military organizations, both in terms of production (collection and analysis) and consumption. In most countries, intelligence has been a military monopoly in both production and consumption. During democratic consolidation there are decisions to be made as to whether military intelligence should be replaced in whole or in part by new civilian organizations. Should the military have responsibilities only in military intelligence and civilians assume responsibility in strategic intelligence and counterintelligence? Equally important as collection is consumption. To whom is the intelligence product distributed? Only the president of the country, his director for intelligence, members of the cabinet such as Interior, only the military, the legislature, who else? Obviously access to the information, and the form in which it is made available, has great implications for the potential power of those who receive it. In the 1996 Guatemala peace agreement, the “Accord on Strengthening of Civil Power and the Function of the Army in a Democratic Society” stipulates that there will be created “a civil department of intelligence and analysis of information’. By April 2000 they had defined the new structure, which included one military and two civilian intelligence organizations, but implementation has been delayed due to the failure of the referendum on constitutional revisions later in the year.

A sub-theme of this balance between civilian and military institutions is the issue of internal and external intelligence. Does the same organization have responsibility for domestic intelligence as well as foreign intelligence? The former is of course mainly counterintelligence, or security intelligence. Are these functions fused? If so, what are the controls so that it is not used for personal political purposes? In most democracies the functions are separate. In the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation handles counterintelligence within the United States, and the Central Intelligence Agency has performed both functions outside the country. In most European democracies the functions are divided between counterintelligence and foreign intelligence, the organizations doing their tasks wherever necessary, at home or abroad. This has not been much of an issue in most of the new democracies since they focused mainly internally. It should be noted that domestic intelligence is cheap in comparison to external intelligence, and most countries cannot afford to do the latter professionally.

The third choice concerns the relationship between intelligence and policy. This also logically involves the issue of coordination among the intelligence organizations. Is all intelligence formally coordinated by a director of central intelligence as in the United States, but separate from policy (the DCI is not in the cabinet)? Or, is it separate as with MI 5 and MI 6 in Great Britain? But as both are located within the Foreign Office intelligence is closely linked with policy. The main issue here concerns an ongoing debate about the implications for objective intelligence analysis when it is closely linked to policy vs. the supposed loss of efficiency by having intelligence that is not linked. There are great variations in how different democracies handle this issue.[25] The answer depends on the political traditions and structures of the country, but the underlying issue of policy-relevant but not policy-driven intelligence is what must be assessed. One of the critiques in the United States of covert action is that these actions fuse all within the CIA. Rather than providing intelligence objectively, the agency develops the policy, conducts it, and largely evaluates its success. Hastedt, who has published one of the few books on controlling intelligence, makes his position explicit on this issue: “The purpose of intelligence is to inform and warn policy-makers. The choice of what to do lies with the policy-maker. If intelligence is brought into too close a contact with policy making it runs the risk of being corrupted.”[26] In the new democracies it is too early to determine how they are dealing with this issue since they are still in the process of defining and implementing new structures and processes in the (often newly – created) ministries of defense and intelligence organizations. Argentina is probably the furthest along in this area of implementing new structures in both areas, but even here the structures are still changing substantially and much remains personality – driven. [27]

All three of these decisions hold implications for democratic control over intelligence. The first choice, about intelligence functions, has obvious implications especially regarding counterintelligence; to include or exclude it. The second, civilian vs. military location of the intelligence function has implications in terms of civilian control over the armed forces and then civilian control over intelligence. Third, a very close link with policy can make intelligence less a function of information gathering and analysis, and more a tool used by political leaders to retain power. In the cases with which I am most familiar – Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, and South Africa – the research suggests that they are dealing well with decisions one and two, but three remains elusive.

Explicit Mechanisms for Control over Intelligence

A common mechanism to control intelligence is through its separation into different agencies. Policymakers should prevent any single agency from having a monopoly on intelligence. This is the model in the United States. A possible arrangement could be separate intelligence organizations for each of the armed forces and the police and separate organizations for domestic and foreign intelligence. This proliferation of organizations may or may not be efficient, since the different agencies battle among themselves, but it eliminates the chances of monopoly by any single organization or individual and creates opportunities for more democratic control. Again, in the post – September 11, 2001 environment in the United States, there is much debate over the relationships and coordination (or lack of coordination) among different sectors of the intelligence communities and especially between CIA and FBI. Most countries that are seeking to reform their intelligence structures have moved in this direction. The four cited previously, as well as others with which I am familiar in Europe and Central America, have created civilian intelligence organizations to complement the military intelligence organizations. In Brazil and Guatemala, for example, there are two civilian organizations.

A second mechanism for democratic control is an oversight mechanism or mechanisms. Does anyone have oversight over intelligence or does the apparatus, and it alone, have responsibility for monitoring its own performance? The latter option is extremely dangerous. In the United States oversight has expanded to the current situation where not only do the intelligence agencies have inspector generals, but also the executive has oversight bodies and the two houses of congress also have oversight committees.[28] In Great Britain, oversight remains very limited but the democratic institutions are hallowed. It seems necessary today in countries that are seeking to consolidate their democracies that if intelligence is to be under democratic civilian control then there must be oversight. How far it extends, and under what terms it operates, will vary tremendously. Oversight has immediate implications for control but also has implications for popular support for intelligence.

Since knowledge equals power, it is important to specify who has access to the intelligence and in what form. Is it limited only to the military or do civilians in the executive also have access? What about the legislature? Do any or all of them have access even before operations such as covert actions? This issue concerns not just immediate distribution of intelligence (which here extends to covert actions as well) but the general availability of information after a certain period of time. The possibility of wider distribution also holds implications for control. If the agencies know that in the future the files will be open for public scrutiny, they must be careful of their behavior.

There is a dilemma inherent in the issue of control, and that is the trade-off between democratic control over intelligence and the effectiveness of the intelligence apparatus doing its job to defend the nation. This dilemma can be reduced to the tension between accountability, which requires transparency, and the intelligence function, which requires secrecy. For example, does legislative oversight result in sources or methods being uncovered? Democracies wrestle with this dilemma constantly and there is no easy or sure solution. Rather, it requires constant attention and adjustment. In discussing legislative oversight in other countries the issue of the reliability or sense of responsibility of legislators always comes up. It is very difficult to make apriori judgments on this issue, but it should be noted that since legislative oversight was imposed in the U.S. in the 1970s there have been far fewer cases of members of Congress or their staffs releasing classified information than leaks from the Executive branch. The issue is not just oversight or not, but how it is implemented and by whom.

The possibility exists that democratically elected civilians may not in fact be interested in controlling the intelligence apparatus in new democracies. In virtually all of these countries, the use of elections to determine access to power is a new and relatively fragile means of determining who has power. Even in old and stable democracies leaders often prefer “plausible deniability” rather than access to the information required to control a potentially controversial or dangerous organization or operation.[29] In theory, this would be even more the case in newer democracies. First, the politicians may be afraid of antagonizing the intelligence apparatus through efforts to control it because the intelligence organization might have something embarrassing on them. Since many politicians in new democracies may have had some dealings with the previous, authoritarian regime, there may well be information that the politician would not like to see made public. This has been a common problem in the former Soviet bloc. Second, they may be afraid because the intelligence organization in the past engaged in arbitrary and violent actions and the politicians are not sure that a corner has been turned. It may be democratic rule has not yet consolidated, so why take the risk? Third, there are probably no votes to be won in attempting to control an organization that most people either don’t know about or want to ignore.

We have found that the issue of democratic control of intelligence can be profitably discussed only in those countries that have already sorted out the more general issues of civilian control of the military and have begun to institutionalize the structures and processes for this control. In the others the environment remains too opaque or problematic for open discussion of intelligence organizations and oversight. Intelligence is nowhere the first priority the new civilian leadership wants to confront.

Towards Democratic Control of Intelligence

 

A General Approach to Demystifying Intelligence

 

For the leaders in those countries that want to exercise democratic civilian control over the intelligence apparatus there are several tasks that must be undertaken. These tasks are similar to those of asserting civilian control over the military in general, but are more acute due to secrecy and the penetration of state and society in line with the counterintelligence function.[30] The tasks that follow are not prioritized, and in fact should be pursued simultaneously. They concern civilian competence, public interest and then pressure, and the profession of intelligence. These tasks are based on my research and experience in conducting seminars on civil – military relations, and on intelligence reform, in countries on three continents.

The first task is to motivate civilians to learn about intelligence so they can control it. In most authoritarian regimes intelligence was monopolized by the military and civilians had no role whatsoever. These countries will be unable to control intelligence unless they prepare civilians to learn enough both to understand what intelligence is all about and to achieve some degree of cooperation, if not respect, from the intelligence professionals. Obviously, it will be necessary to interest civilians to become intelligence professionals, which will be dealt with below. None of this will be easy, but one has to start somewhere. It should begin with the formal and public commitment by the government to reviewing intelligence to establish a new policy. This has been done in such countries as Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, and South Africa. It happened in these countries mainly due to the bargain resulting from the democratic transitions. The commitment must also open the possibility for civilian positions in intelligence. Otherwise, as in civil–military relations in general, no civilians will come forward if they do not anticipate viable careers. Then, civilians can begin to learn about intelligence by reading the unclassified literature from several countries and taking advantage of cooperative training arrangements in intelligence with other nations. For example, we offered a week – long seminar specifically on this topic in Argentina in September 1998. We also offer a semester long course on the topic of “Intelligence and Democracy” in a masters’ degree program at the Naval Postgraduate School and U.S. and international students can write theses on these topics. It also makes sense to establish regional programs for them to share their insights and further develop their common fund of knowledge, with regional intelligence sharing programs an obvious result.

The second task is broader and it is to encourage a political culture, which supports the legitimate role of intelligence in a democracy but does not allow it to run rampant. In theory, this should be easier after September 11, 2001, and terrorist attacks in Indonesia, Pakistan, Russia, and Europe in that terrorism has been seen to be able to strike just about anywhere in the World. The responsibility must go in both directions; from democratically elected civilians to control intelligence but from them as well to not release classified information for personal or political reason. How can this culture be encouraged? As in the general case of democratic civil–military relations, by generating a public debate. The challenge is to break through the current apathy or fear of the population regarding intelligence by initiating the debate. In some older democracies, including Canada, France, Great Britain, and the United States there is a fairly regular debate stimulated by non–governmental organizations (NGOs) and the media, which is periodically galvanized by intelligence fiascoes that become public. This debate is obviously much more serious and animated after September 11, 2001. The role of the media is crucial, and their awareness of intelligence can be encouraged in the same manner as the public. Again, the debate can be stimulated by the politicians’ commitment to establish a policy on intelligence. Such a debate has been initiated in a few of the newer democracies. The Peace Accords in Guatemala between the government and the guerrillas signed in December 1996 stipulate in several sections that intelligence will be transformed and put under civilian oversight. These commitments have led to public seminars on intelligence, publications by NGOs, and articles in the newspapers.[31] In Argentina there also was a debate initiated by a small number of civilians realizing that democratic consolidation requires civilian control over intelligence. And, more recently in Brazil the government’s commitment to revise the intelligence system has generated a public debate, and this conference is an excellent contribution to its continuation and deepening. This debate serves a number of important functions. It demythologizes intelligence thereby allowing outsiders to more realistically assess the necessity of intelligence and its value for a country; it creates legitimate space for civilians who want to become intelligence specialists; and it puts pressure on the government to be more transparent. It should be noted that international NGOs are very willing to assist other countries in generating this debate.[32] The third task is not about civilians or the public in general, but concerns the selection, training, and overall preparation of intelligence professionals; those who specialize as intelligence officers working for the state.

Intelligence as a Profession

The focus on intelligence as a profession is particularly apt since these professionals, more than any other single profession, are controlled even in a democracy by professional norms more than outside controls (such as oversight).[33] In contrast to intelligence professionals, in addition to their self-policing, or ethic, doctors are regulated by the legal system and licensing boards, lawyers by the legal system and bar associations, politicians by the legal system and elections, and the armed forces by budgets, promotions, and a myriad of civilian control mechanisms. The intelligence professionals, however, are controlled only in the last analysis, if at all, by the external structures and processes noted above. This is especially the case with counterintelligence professionals. As illustrated in virtually all the books and articles dealing with intelligence officers, secrecy allows them to operate with a tremendous amount of autonomy. There are few checks because they operate secretly, they are ensconced in a bureaucracy with other like-minded individuals and develop a closed-club mentality, and they are very suspicious of outsiders, including at times their superiors.

First, their expertise is defined in line with the four intelligence functions of collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action defined above. The range of what intelligence professionals do is extremely diverse. For some, such as analysts, there is a large component of education, whereas for HUMINT collectors and counterintelligence specialists, on the job training is more important. What unifies them, or characterizes them more than any other single factor as intelligence professionals, is secrecy. Unlike other professions, but for certain limited aspects of patient or client privacy or privilege, the intelligence professional is defined by secrecy. (The military profession also has elements of secrecy but mainly these pertain to intelligence.) In reference to covert actions one of the foremost American intelligence professionals, Richard M. Bissell Jr. states:

The professional competence of a clandestine service consists of, and is measured by, its ability to carry out operations secretly (or deniably), much as lawyers’ competence consists in their ability to win cases, and doctors’ in their ability to prevent or treat illness. The clandestine service may number among its members brilliant journalists, able warriors, and superior political analysts, but the professional skill for which, presumably, they are hired is the ability to organize and conduct operations covertly. This is a rather specialized skill not widely found outside of intelligence and internal security services.[34]

 

And, in reference to counterintelligence one of the foremost British intelligence professionals states:

The profession of intelligence is a solitary one. There is comaraderie, of course, but in the end you are alone with your secrets. You live and work at a feverish pitch of excitement, dependent always on the help of your colleagues. But you always move on, whether to a new branch or department, or to a new operation. And when you move on, you inherit new secrets which subtly divorce you from those you have worked with before. Contacts, especially with the outside world, are casual, since the largest part of yourself cannot be shared.[35]

 

Their expertise is thus diverse, as is intelligence itself, and the defining characteristic of the profession is secrecy.

Second, the ethic of the intelligence professional is to serve in defense of the state. But if we consider the first criterion of expertise in secret matters, we are led inexorably to a profession, which largely governs itself according to its own definition of responsibility. The enforcement mechanisms are extremely weak. In new democracies this is doubly serious, as the state was not accountable to the general population and the intelligence officers may not have even been responsible to the small group controlling the state. Who can know and who is to control? The sense of responsibility is incredibly important, and even in stable democracies enough incidents come to light to cause concern that the intelligence officers are not serving the state. Or, better, they are serving it in their limited organizational terms and not those of the democratically elected leaders. This sense is captured in a quote from James Angleton, head of counterintelligence at the CIA, when testifying before Congress on why the CIA had not destroyed stocks of a toxic poison: “It is inconceivable that a secret intelligence arm of the government has to comply with all the overt orders of the government.”[36] It is difficult to accommodate this kind of attitude with the procedures and culture of democracy. In sum, especially with counterintelligence, there are minimal sanctions to enforce an ethic of responsibility to the democratically elected leaders of a state.

Third, their corporateness is defined by their access to secret systems, documents, information, sources, and operations. As doctors enter the profession through boards and internships & residencies, professors by comprehensive examinations and Ph.D. dissertations, and lawyers by the bar exams, intelligence professionals enter via security clearances. Clearances are the control mechanism for entry into and continuing in the profession. There are few educational requirements in common for intelligence professionals, even between different intelligence organizations within one country, and there is little else that defines their corporate identity but for their access to classified information.[37] Of the different functions of intelligence, those requiring the least amount of education are precisely the HUMINT collectors and counterintelligence. (Covert action is in a category by itself, and cannot be generalized about.) In intelligence everything is compartmented; different levels of clearances plus the need to know determine access. Even officers with similar clearances do not, are not supposed to, discuss information unless they have the need to know in terms of their current projects and responsibilities. The security clearances, the working together in secret and on secret information and projects, create identification as a member of a unique club. It may also breed certain arrogance, or sense of impunity, since if nobody else knows then how can those that don’t know control those that do?

To Change a Profession

This review of the defining characteristics of the intelligence profession should make it obvious that major efforts must be made in the new democracies to promote and inculcate a sense of professional responsibility by making the intelligence officers and agencies accountable to the state via the democratically elected leaders. How to do this? Only by committing great attention and resources to recruitment, training, and requiring that the professionals remain involved in the larger polity and society. The specifics of this prescription have to be defined separately for each nation. If security intelligence was the predominant form of intelligence, then it will be very difficult since their professional ethic is probably weaker than analysts. One of the biggest difficulties is that the government will most easily recruit retired military into civilian intelligence positions. They may have taken off the uniform, but their attitudes remain the same as those of everyone around them. If new personnel cannot be found, then can their ethic of responsibility be changed? In most countries, including the older democracies, there is little explicit attention to promoting this ethic.[38] In the older democracies the larger society supports responsibility to the democratic state and the institutions are not under question so there is less need to promote the ethic. In the newer democracies there is clearly a need to promote it as well as promoting an open debate on intelligence and interesting civilians in the field.[39] To the best of my knowledge, none of the new democracies have yet focused on changing the profession. In line with what was covered above, a public debate can generate interest and make new personnel available for recruitment into the intelligence community. Then, there must be a career track, along with the expectation of promotions for successful performance, in order to keep the best. The career must also include education and on the job training. In short, intelligence is a profession and must be treated as one. It already has a culture, or an ethic, and it may or may not be supportive of democracy. Who is selected by the political leaders as the heads of the intelligence community will convey much to those in the community, and to the society in general, as to how the government views this profession. In many cases those selected are not from the intelligence professionals at all, and certainly not those from the analytical community, but rather close friends of the president with no background at all in the profession.

Conclusion

All nations engage in intelligence activities at one scale or another. They must as other countries do, and no nation can afford to not know what is going on outside and inside their country, and if necessary counter other countries’ efforts to influence developments in that country. In most of the world intelligence services of authoritarian regimes were central to the survival of those regimes and was mainly counterintelligence. Today, in the midst of challenges to democratic consolidation, seeking to ensure democratic control over intelligence is both necessary and extremely difficult. In many countries there is virtually no public recognition of this fact. Without decisive action, however, the intelligence apparatus will remain a state within a state and prevent democratic consolidation. Like all else in civil–military relations, the challenges are many and it requires continual efforts on the part of civilians and officers to achieve the most appropriate balance of efficiency and transparency for the country. The concept of intelligence as a profession is used here to highlight not only the problems of intelligence reforms, but also ways to change it. As illustrated at times in the body of this report, a small but significant group of countries have undertaken to reform their intelligence systems and have generated a public debate. This is an area in which international assistance is available, and on which there is an increasing body of useful literature. (This includes Gill, Holt, Lowenthal, Williams & Deletant).

A Note on Sources and Expertise

The literature on intelligence is commonly broken down into four categories: memoirs of retired intelligence professionals; exposes by disgruntled former professionals, journalists, and activists; government reports, studies, and documents; and academic studies. Of these four categories only the last is largely objective. The other three are motivated by personal, partisan, or national goals, and thus contains some kind of bias or “agenda,” which is very difficult to evaluate objectively. Further, the literature in any one category is not so abundant that the interested student can dispense with material in any one of these categories. This is not the place to assess the literature in general, but to highlight that there is much material on the United States and now Russia, less on European democracies and South Africa, and very little on the new democracies in book or journal articles. Now, with the Internet there are available sources of information on aspects of intelligence throughout the world. There is not, however, to the best of my knowledge, any literature to provide the background and discussion of issues in which to locate this current Internet information on the new democracies. Further, by the fact of being found on the Internet does not guarantee that it is accurate. In sum, the material is sketchy and an overall conceptual framework is yet to be written. Also to the best of my knowledge, there is only one book that touches upon intelligence as a profession. Bar-Joseph, in his 1995 book, brings up the focus on intelligence as a profession, but rejects it as the educational component is supposedly lacking. Depending on whom we focus on in the intelligence community, this is true or not. And, even if there is not an educational component, this does not disqualify intelligence from being analyzed as a profession.

To write this article I drew on the available literature less for inspiration and analysis, and more for examples of the points I wanted to make. My background and current activities are what provided the framework. I attended graduate school in Political Science at the University of California at Berkeley during the 1960s. After completing my studies in 1969 I taught at McGill University, Montreal until 1987. During that time I researched on “hot” topics; first on politics and religion in Brazil (during the authoritarian regime) and later on the Portuguese Revolution and its path to democratic consolidation. During that period of two decades I had occasion to meet intelligence officers abroad who would ask me lots of questions but never told me anything. Lacking reciprocity I avoided contact with them. In 1987 I joined the Naval Postgraduate School and in 1989 became chairman of the Department of National Security Affairs. In that position I qualified to receive a security clearance because I had to attend meetings and read documents requiring it. The clearance allowed me to learn quite a lot about the United States intelligence community with seminars and meetings at the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Office of Naval Intelligence, Office of the Joints Chiefs of Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense at the Pentagon, regional headquarters of the armed forces, and American embassies abroad. Because our department offers one of the two masters degree programs in intelligence (the other is the Joint Military Intelligence College), we have alumnae in intelligence positions thoughout the community. Through these contacts, and involvement with our courses, faculty, and students, I became interested in intelligence as a field of study. I could then appreciate the “one-way street” of information in my earlier experience since I had not been “cleared” at that time. Unfortunately for the field of study, as noted in the text of this article, most of intelligence is “slippery” in that there is much information on systems, tradecraft, and wiring diagrams, but little analysis of intelligence as organization and system. The effort is put into analysis of the information and not the organization. From my exposure to intelligence professionals I could then better appreciate that one can know very little about intelligence generically. The field is extremely diverse, compartmentalized, and controlled. This is definitely one of those areas in which “those that say don’t know, and those that know don’t say.”

When the Center for Civil–Military Relations was founded in 1994 I became involved as director of the programs in Latin America. It was clear to me, with my background in Brazil and Portugal, that intelligence is a core element in civil–military relations. Consequently we include a block of study on it in most of our programs in the region. We also developed a full week program on the topic of intelligence and democracy held in Buenos Aires in August 1998. The experience throughout Latin America, put me into contact with officers who are intelligence professionals and a small number of civilians who are interested in intelligence. Several of the examples used to illustrate the text above are drawn from these contacts. To write this paper I also conducted interviews with former intelligence professionals who provided some insights into how they view the profession. My thanks to them for sharing their knowledge with me.